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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to introduce a tool for the international comparative analysis of regulatory 
regimes in the field of building regulation. On the basis of a heuristic model drawn from regulatory 
literature, a typology of building regulatory regimes is introduced. Each type is illustrated with a 
number of real-life examples from North America, Europe and Australia. The comparative analysis of 
different regimes assists policy makers by demonstrating which combinations of regulatory 
characteristics can provide the best results in particular instances. The typology introduced by the 
paper assists this process by providing a tool for systematic analysis of complex real-life cases. 
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International comparative analysis of building regulations: an analytical tool 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Contemporary building regulations in developed countries have their origins in the nineteenth 
century, when changes in society due to the industrial revolution provided governments with reason 
to become increasingly involved in the building industry (see, for instance, the development of early 
building regulations in England: Ash and Ash, 1899; Emden, 1885; France: Risler, 1915; the United 
States: Gould, 1895; and the Netherlands: Kocken, 2004; Van der Heijden et al., 2007). These changes 
included the urgent demand for housing for a growing number of immigrants, and the discovery of 
the relationship between insanitary conditions and public health. Since the nineteenth century, those 
regulations have been adapted to suit contemporary needs and, globally, current building regulations 
cover a broad range of topics, including safety, public health, amenity and sustainability (see, for 
instance, present day building codes in the United States: ABCB, 2004; Canada: CCBFC, 2005; ICC, 
2006; and various European countries: Sheridan et al., 2003). 
 
Although they have adapted to modern standards, until recently the traditional framework of 
building regulations has remained largely unchanged. For example, town-planning regulations and 
technical building regulations typically continue to operate within separate regulatory codes (ABCB, 
2004; CCBFC, 2005; ICC, 2006; Sheridan et al., 2003). In practice the assessment of (planned) 
buildings prior to occupation and the assessment of existing buildings also typically operate within 
separate procedural frameworks, as do the assessment of building plans and the assessment of 
buildings under construction (ibid). 
 
The enforcement of building regulations has also traditionally been carried out by governmental 
agencies. Notwithstanding the fact that compliance can often be achieved through a wide range of 
strategies or incentives (cf. Baldwin and Cave, 1999), the enforcement of building regulations 
traditionally consists of the assessment of building plans, the inspection of buildings under 
construction and buildings in use by municipal building control departments (BCD): public building 
control (Hansen, 1985; Meijer et al., 2003; PC, 2004).  However, change is in the air. 
 
Since the 1990s the private sector has become involved in the enforcement of building regulations in 
countries such as Australia (ABCB, 1999), Canada (BCMH, 2007), New Zealand (Hunn, 2002) and parts 
of Europe (Meijer et al., 2003). Notably, private-sector involvement has taken a variety of forms in 
different countries and it has been argued that particular arrangements can be expected to result in 
specific ‘directions’ of consequences in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, accountability and equity 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998; May, 2007). This has implications for 
policy makers when selecting the type of arrangement to implement in a specific situation. It also 
generates a need for empirical research to assist policy makers by comparing real-life arrangements 
and analysing them in terms of their actual consequences. 
 
Unfortunately, there are difficulties in pursuing this type of comparative research because of the 
wide variety of real-life arrangements that have been implemented in different jurisdictions. In 
theory this could include any arrangement between ‘totally public’ and ‘totally private’ but, in 
practice, arrangements often seem to overlap and the boundaries blur (cf. Gunningham and 
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Grabosky, 1998; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Price and Verhulst, 2000; Sinclair, 1997; Vining et al., 
2005). Furthermore, different governments have labelled their own chosen regulatory governance 
arrangements in different ways. As a result, different labels have been used to describe similar 
arrangements, while similar labels have been used to describe different arrangements. 
 
This paper therefore aims to develop a typology of arrangements and to introduce a language for 
comparative policy analysis in the field of building regulations which will assist future research in this 
area.  Although the paper makes no attempt to draw comparisons between the arrangement types 
themselves, it nevertheless introduces some of the findings from other fields of regulatory research 
in order to indicate the possible outcomes of particular regimes. In the following section a heuristic 
framework underlying the typology of regulatory regimes is introduced. The different types of regime 
are then presented and illustrated with a variety of examples.  Finally, the typology and its use for 
comparative analysis in the field of building regulations are discussed. 
 
2 Regulatory regimes: a heuristic framework 
 
In order to make regulations work effectively it is generally understood that they need to be 
enforced (e.g. Giddens, 1984, 18; Weber, 1964 [1921], 126-153). The complete framework of 
regulation and enforcement as a means for achieving regulatory goals can be referred to as a 
‘regulatory regime’ (May, 2007, 9). It is possible to identify a number of different characteristics of 
regulatory regimes, including the quality of regulations, enforcement strategies, enforcement styles 
and enforcement actors. 
 
Firstly, studies of the quality of regulations often focus on whether rules will lead to compliance (e.g. 
Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Griffiths, 2003). The characteristics analysed are adequacy, feasibility, legal 
certainty and adaptability (Van Rooij, 2006, 32-43). 
 
Secondly, the term enforcement strategy is used to describe the tactical choices made by 
enforcement agencies and the type of actions these agencies take (e.g. Hawkins, 1984; Kagan, 1994; 
May and Burby, 1998). Tactical choices refer mainly to issues such as allocating resources, setting 
targets, and monitoring outcomes. Types of action refer mainly to issues such as sanctions and 
incentives (e.g. Baldwin and Cave, 1999). 
 
Thirdly, enforcement style describes the relationship between inspector and inspectee (e.g. Hutter, 
1997; Kagan, 1994). A wide variety of possible enforcement styles is described. Based on the 
responsive regulation philosophy (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), most styles seem to fit onto a sliding 
scale defined by a consultative, facilitative approach at one end to a rigid, legalistic approach at the 
other end (cf. May and Wood, 2003). 
 
Fourthly and finally, studies have focused on the so-called enforcement actors. These are the parties 
that can be assigned or delegated tasks and responsibilities in regulation and enforcement. 
Contemporary literature identifies a wide range of parties that are or may be involved in regulation 
and enforcement, such as governmental agencies, corporate organisations, professional bodies, and 
public interest groups (e.g. Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). 
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The study of these characteristics can certainly provide a wealth of insight into the nature of different 
regulatory regimes. However, the various characteristics within a particular regime do not exist in 
isolation but influence and are influenced by each other. Leading works on regulatory governance 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, chapter 4; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998, chapter 6) argue that 
more efficient and effective regulatory governance should involve a mix of certain types of 
regulations, enforcement strategies, enforcement styles, and enforcement actors.  
 
Nevertheless, there is much debate as to how, precisely, these ingredients should be combined to 
produce optimum effectiveness and efficiency (cf. Decker, 2007; Nielsen, 2006; Sparrow, 2000). This 
question can only be answered through comparative research into the relationships between 
different regime-design combinations and their respective regime-outcomes. Due to the wide 
variations of regime-design combinations introduced in different jurisdictions a mechanism exists for 
the empirical study of these issues and the variations between jurisdictions provide what (Levi-Faur, 
2004) describes as  ‘the most powerful engines of causal analysis’ (Levi-Faur, 2004).  
 
In this context it can be seen that the real strength of the ‘regulatory regime’ concept actually lies in 
its ability to provide a tool for the comparative analysis of combinations of the various characteristics 
rather than simply as a taxonomy of the characteristics themselves. The heuristic framework that 
underlies the typology introduced in the remainder of this paper builds on the different levels of 
tasks and responsibilities that can be assigned to different enforcement actors. 
 
The element at the top-level of the framework is the arrangement of tasks and responsibilities 
regarding setting regulations – I shall term this level regulation.  
 
The element at the middle level of the framework is the arrangement of tasks and responsibilities 
regarding setting standards for enforcement. The issues at this level are the criteria that have to be 
met in order to be allowed to enforce regulations and oversight of enforcement – enforcement itself 
is often enforced as well; to avoid confusion in terminology I refer to the ‘enforcing of enforcement’ 
as oversight (cf. Cohen and Rubin, 1985, 176). This level is termed enforcement criteria and oversight.  
 
The element at the lowest level of the framework is the arrangement of responsibilities regarding the 
actual execution of enforcement tasks. The issues at this level are the relationship between enforcer 
and regulatee and the enforcement style used. This level is termed execution of enforcement tasks. 
Tasks and responsibilities can be allocated to public and/or private-sector actors at each of the three 
different levels in the framework. 
 
3 A typology of regulatory regimes 
 
The typology introduced in this part of the paper involves a gradual shift from a regime in which all 
responsibilities and tasks relating to regulation and enforcement are allocated to public-sector actors 
to one in which all responsibilities and tasks are allocated to private-sector actors. This is developed 
by initially assigning all tasks and responsibilities to governmental actors, a traditional, ‘pure public’ 
set-up, and then shifting these duties and responsibilities one by one, and level by level, to private-
sector actors. 
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A total of five regulatory regimes are presented here: public, prescribed co-regulation, conditional 
co-regulation, substitute co-regulation, and private. The term co-regulation is used to indicate 
regimes that combine both public and private-sector involvement (cf. Gunningham and Grabosky, 
1998, 55). Each of these regime types is illustrated with real life example, from North America, 
Europe and Australia. In order to illustrate the building regulatory regimes, I have selected cases 
from journal papers, governmental reports and websites of the regulatory agencies mentioned. It 
goes without saying that the regulatory regimes presented are truly ideal-type normative models. 
 
Public regime 
 
The first type, the public regime, can be compared with a traditional command-and-control regime. 
All responsibilities for setting building regulations, setting the rules and criteria which relate to 
enforcement, overseeing enforcement, and executing enforcement lie with governmental actors. An 
enforcement relationship exists between enforcer and regulatee and an oversight relationship may 
exist between or within governmental bodies. The public regime is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Public regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This type of regime can be found in many European countries (Meijer and Visscher, 1998) and in 
parts of Australia (ABCB, 1999), the Unites States (LaFaive, 2001) and Canada (Hansen, 1985). 
However, true pure public regimes appear to be dying out. As the different illustrative examples in 
this paper show, pure public regimes are being replaced in many countries by co-regulatory regimes. 
 
Public regimes can be understood as the ‘traditional’ approach to building regulatory enforcement. 
Under such regimes a higher governmental body, such as a national or federal agency, lays down 
building regulations, and a lower governmental body, such as a local or municipal agency, is then 
responsible for regulatory enforcement. Regulatory enforcement is often carried out through a 
building plan assessment and on-site construction work assessment. Public regimes are found in 
Denmark and the Netherlands (Meijer et al., 2003). However, the possibility of involving certified 
private-sector agents in assessing building plans has recently been introduced in the Netherlands. 
 
From a recent analysis of the Dutch regime (Van der Heijden et al., 2007), it emerged that Dutch 
municipal building control departments (BCDs) face problems in the enforcement of public building 
regulations. BCDs were found to be carrying out their legal tasks, including assessing building plans 
and construction work and issuing permits, in various ways. Process times, assessment criteria and 
the fees charged were found to differ so widely that a ‘national process’ could not be identified. BCDs 
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also appeared insufficiently equipped to assess complex building work, and some smaller 
municipalities made it clear that some legal tasks, especially the assessment of buildings under 
construction, were not carried out at all. 
 
These findings are partly in line with general criticisms of pure public regimes. Critics of this strategy 
state that it is ineffective and expensive. They argue that it suffers from problems with enforcement, 
including a lack of technical knowledge on the part of the enforcer, and that it focuses excessively on 
‘end-of-pipe’ solutions (cf. Fairman and Yapp, 2005, 493). The regime is said to be prone to 
‘regulatory capture’ when the relationship between the regulator and the regulatee becomes too 
close (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 36-37). Furthermore, the regime can be subject to legalism (ibid, 37-
38) when the proliferation of rules leads to over-regulation which may strangle innovation in the 
market. Subsequently, regulators may face the difficulty of translating public goals into technical 
standards – what exactly is a safe, healthy and sustainable environment? Finally, the enforcement of 
technical regulations can be difficult or expensive due to the complexity of these rules, and 
governmental agencies may lack the resources to enforce these (ibid, 38-39). Nevertheless, the 
advantage of a regime like this, from the public sector’s point of view, is that the government retains 
full political power (ibid, 35). 
 
Prescribed co-regulation regime 
 
The second regime type, prescribed co-regulation, is characterised by a government that takes full 
responsibility for setting regulations and setting standards for overseeing enforcement. The actual 
execution of enforcement, however, is delegated to private-sector actors. Within this regime, 
governments can contract out enforcement, or enter into agreements (‘covenants’) with private-
sector actors. The involvement of private-sector actors occurs according to certain clearly defined 
criteria which regulate their participation and administration while allowing them to enforce the 
regulations. In this way, governmental actors retain indirect responsibility for the execution of 
enforcement.  
An enforcement relationship exists between enforcer and regulatee and an oversight 
relationship may exist between or within governmental bodies. Further supervisory relationships 
arise at the level of execution. For example, in order to ensure that its own responsibilities are 
fulfilled, the indirectly responsible governmental actor may want to supervise contracts or covenants 
made with the private actors, or it may want to oversee the fulfilment of the participation and 
administration criteria. Internal supervision may also exist within private and/or third-sector actors. 
The prescribed co-regulation regime is illustrated in Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2 Prescribed co-regulation regime 
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Examples of this regime type can be found in the United States, Australia, Canada and various 
European countries. In regulatory literature, this regime-type is occasionally found to result in net 
gains in effectiveness when compared to a ‘pure’ public regime. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992, 104), 
for example, find that ‘corporate inspectors are better trained and tend to achieve a greater 
inspectorial depth’; and Baldwin and Cave (1999, 126) note that corporate bodies ‘can usually 
command higher levels of relevant expertise and technical knowledge than is possible with 
independent regulation’. Traditional public building authorities often have a limited number of staff, 
and prefer to hire generalists than specialists, while private-sector actors are able to specialise.  
 
This regime-type is also found to result in net gains in technical efficiency compared to a pure public 
regime. These efficiency gains can result from the different approach that private-sector actors take 
to enforcement tasks, or the different motivations they may have. For instance, a municipal building 
control officer’s income does not rise in proportion to the amount of work he or she carries out, 
while a private inspector’s income does (cf. Leibenstein, 1966). Gunningham and Grabosky (1998, 
52), for example, state that private-sector involvement in a regulatory regime ‘offers greater speed, 
flexibility, sensitivity to market circumstances, efficiency, and less government intervention than 
command and control regulation’. 
 
An illustrative example of a covenant, or agreement, between private and public actors designed to 
achieve compliance with building regulations at the execution level is the case of the John Hopkins 
University and the building authority of Howard County in the US (Loesch and Hammerman, 1998). 
The University frequently has to carry out in-house alterations to meet certain research goals. In 
order to overcome issues such as delays resulting from traditional permit review processes, the 
University entered into an agreement on compliance with building regulations with the County 
authorities, and a ‘Master Building Permit’ was drawn up. The agreement relies on a prescribed 
quality assurance model which includes procedures for design and construction approval reviews 
based on the building regulatory framework, and a prescribed in-house supervision model to certify 
that alterations have been carried out according to approved plans. Occasionally the County carries 
out spot checks, inspections and audits. According to Loesch & Hammerman (1998), this agreement 
benefits both the University, which saves time by bypassing traditional plan review and approval 
processes, and the County which saves resources. 
 
However, it is not only gains which are ascribed to this regime-type. The introduction of private-
sector involvement may potentially introduce conflicts between private and public interests (cf. 
DeMarzo et al., 2005, 688; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998, 52; Hodge and Coghill, 2007). The 
competition for clientele in particular may make the regime susceptible to ‘regulatory capture’ 
where either the relationship between private-sector inspector and his or her clients becomes too 
close, or clients may ‘shop around’ for an inspector that suits their needs (cf. Baldwin, 2005, 129-130; 
Scholz, 1984, 401). As a result, an additional layer of supervision or oversight may be needed to 
monitor the enforcement by private-sector actors, and this could reduce the impact of gains in 
effectiveness and efficiency (cf. Cohen and Rubin, 1985). 
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An example of regulatory capture can be found in Germany, where private-sector check engineers 
are allowed to carry out building plan assessment. This check engineer may act on behalf of public 
authorities and, as such, may verify whether design and structural work conforms to legal 
requirements (Meijer et al., 2003, 98). The qualification requirements are laid down in the building 
regulatory framework, as are administration requirements (Zander, 2005). The check engineer is fully 
responsible and liable for the structures he or she inspects (ibid). However, the collapse of a skating 
rink in Germany made it clear that this regime involves implicit dangers. Reports on the court-case of 
this incident showed that the check engineer had withheld essential information which revealed 
issues about the structural safety of the building (der Spiegel, 2006, 2008). A lack of oversight of this 
private check engineer had allowed him this freedom, while commercial pressure had provided a 
motive. 
 
Another potential outcome of this regime is a blurring of liability. An example to illustrate this point 
is found in the City of Vancouver. The City has established a regulatory regime, the Certified 
Professional Program, under which an individual can apply to become a Certified Professional (CP). 
To become a CP, an individual has to meet criteria set and overseen by the City. Once certified, a CP 
is allowed to enforce public building regulations, but only for complex construction work. The City of 
Vancouver has laid down protocols for building plan assessments, site controls and final inspections 
to guide the work of a CP (OHCS, 2007). The City also oversees each enforcement task carried out by 
a CP and the final decision on compliance with regulations is made by the City’s building officials. An 
analysis of the CP program (Richmond, 1999) shows that processing times were shortened by the 
introduction of the CP program. However, liability appears to be a concern (ibid, 6) since the City’s 
role can be unclear. On the one hand, the CP program partially relieves the City of assessing building 
plans; on the other hand, the City still is responsible for issuing permits. Liability issues could arise if 
the City approved a building plan or wrongly issued CP documentation. To what extent can the City 
be held responsible? This issue bears a resemblance to ‘the problem of many hands’ (Thompson, 
1980). 
 
Furthermore, the duplication of tasks could lead to a loss of allocative efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966): 
welfare maximisation could be optimised if unique resources were used for unique goals. In the 
example of the City of Vancouver, for instance, the municipal building official has to carry out a 
number of administrative tasks in order to issue a permit based upon a CP’s inspection report. Some 
of these tasks are also carried out by the CP. However, the advantage of this partial duplication of 
tasks is that the City retains a larger degree of control over the CP’s enforcement process. 
  
Conditional co-regulation regime 
 
The third regime-type, conditional co-regulation, is characterised by a government that takes full 
responsibility for setting regulations. Responsibility for setting criteria for and overseeing the 
enforcement of the regulations is delegated to private-sector actors, although government places 
conditions on the activities of these private-sector actors in this area. Thus, the government has 
indirect responsibility and private-sector actors, when participating, have direct responsibility for the 
level of ‘enforcement criteria and oversight’. As such, the government outlines its conditions and 
leaves it to private-sector actors to fill in the conditions set, for example with regard to the 
participation and/or administration criteria. Responsibility for the execution of enforcement lies 
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solely with private-sector actors. The middle level of the regimes becomes a ‘public-private 
partnership’. 
 
An enforcement relationship exists between enforcer and regulatee and an oversight relationship 
may exist between the indirectly responsible governmental actor and the directly responsible 
private-sector actors. Furthermore, supervision relationships, oversight, may exist between or within 
private actors. The conditional co-regulation regime is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 Conditional co-regulation regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples of this regime-type are found in Australia, New Zealand and various European countries. 
This regime-type is sometimes found to result in effectiveness and efficiency gains when compared 
to a ‘pure’ public regime, as was the case with the prescribed co-regulation regime-type previously 
discussed (see also, DeMarzo et al., 2005; Lenox, 2006; Schulz and Held, 2004). 
 
An example which illustrates such a ‘partnership’ between the government and private sector within 
a conditional co-regulation regime is the case of the ‘P-mark’ in Sweden (Anneling, 1998). The P-mark 
model is a certification regime developed by a Swedish government body, Statens Planverk (SP), in 
cooperation with the building industry, insurance companies and other interested parties. Under this 
regime, manufacturers can be certified for the construction of prefabricated detached houses. The P-
mark is used to show that a product meets the requirements laid down in laws, standards or 
established regulations. Performance criteria and certification criteria have been drawn up by the 
cooperative. The performance criteria relate to the Swedish building code, while the certification 
criteria relate to the quality system of the manufacturer and in-factory compliance assessment; test 
methods have been drawn up to verify compliance (Horvat and Fazio, 2005). Twice a year SP carries 
out an unannounced inspection at the factories and five percent of all finished houses are also 
inspected annually by SP. 
 
In the Australian state of Victoria, consumers are also allowed the choice between engaging a 
municipal building control surveyor and seeking the same service from a private building control 
surveyor known as a ‘private certifier’. In Victoria, the public and private sectors have to compete for 
clientele (VCEC, 2005). Private certifiers and municipal building surveyors have the same 
responsibilities and are allowed to carry out the same tasks. Private certifiers have to meet criteria 
set by the Building Practitioners Board, an independent regulatory agency whose stakeholders 
represent private-sector organisations. This Board also oversees the private certifiers’ practices, but 
LEVEL 
REGULATION  
ENFORCEMENT CRITERIA AND OVERSIGHT  
EXECUTION OF ENFORCEMENT TASKS 
ACTORS 
PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
PRESCRIBED CO-REGULATION 
X 
- 
X 
- 
X 
X 
Van der Heijden (2013) International comparative analysis of building regulations – page 10 of 18 
 
 10 
receives administrative support from a ministerial department to do this: a ‘public-private 
partnership’. A review of inquiries showed that accountability is considered an issue within the 
regime (VCEC, 2005, 82): private certifiers are often considered to be subject to commercial pressure 
and conflicts of interest, which may sometimes lead them to cut corners. However, compared to 
other Australian regimes under which private certifiers are overseen by public agencies, the 
background of the Building Practitioners Board is regarded as an advantage in the regime’s model of 
oversight (PC, 2004): they may have a better knowledge of the field than public agencies. This 
reasoning appears to be consistent with findings by Baldwin and Cave (1999, 127), who note that 
private-sector regulators ‘with their easy access to those under control, experience low costs in 
acquiring the information that is necessary […] and enjoy the trust of the regulated group’ (see also, 
Bardach and Kagan, 1982, 219; Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998, 44-47). 
 
Examples of similar ‘competitive relationships’ between the public and private sectors can be found 
in the introduction of private inspectorates in England and Wales (Baiche et al., 2006; Imrie, 2004), 
and New Zealand (May, 2003). In England and Wales, economic pressure was found to ‘have a 
deleterious effect on the quality of inspections’ (Baiche et al., 2006, 280) since the chance of losing a 
client means that inspection officers only use harsher means of enforcement and penalties as a last 
resort (Imrie, 2004). In New Zealand, meanwhile, developers chose private-sector involvement en 
masse because private inspectors took a less strict approach to enforcement than their municipal 
counterparts (May, 2003). 
 
A building regulatory regime that seems to differ from these examples, when viewed from the 
outside, but which has a similar set-up, can be found in France. The French building regulatory 
framework is characterised by the significance of insurance. The French regime stipulates compulsory 
insurance for the various actors involved when a client and a builder enter into a contract; all parties 
involved, including the owner, vendor and developer, must take out this insurance covering the 
liability attributed to them by the Civil Code. This compulsory insurance has a duration of ten years 
and covers issues such as structural elements, electrical and other installations (Baccouche and Elias, 
1998; Meijer et al., 2003). Insurers often require that a technical inspection is carried out by a 
privately owned technical inspection body as a prerequisite for issuing an insurance policy. Duties 
and responsibilities regarding technical inspection are laid down in the Spinetta Law. The Centre 
Scientifique et Technique du Bâtiment (Scientific and Technical Centre for Buildings), a non-
governmental organisation, supervises the work of these technical inspection bodies. Within the 
French regime, local governments have limited enforcement tasks. These are restricted to building 
plan control, environmental conditions, zoning and town planning issues (Baccouche and Elias, 1998). 
 
Another issue that may arise under this regime-type is a loss of equity. Service provision may not be 
equally accessible for different groups, or groups may not be equally subject to enforcement. The 
general notion that involving the private sector in a regulatory regime could result in such a decline 
of equity is mentioned by Burkey and Harris (2006). In the Australian case introduced above, it was 
found that private certifiers seem to ‘cream’ the market (cf. Bailey, 1988, 304; Stoker, 1998, 23) 
leaving municipalities with the more difficult and less profitable jobs (VCEC, 2005, 82). As Wilson 
(1989, 169) has noted, municipal agencies must often ‘cope with a clientele not of their own 
choosing’ whereas private-sector actors can choose their clientele. 
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Substitute co-regulation regime 
 
The fourth type of regime, substitute co-regulation, is characterised by a government that takes full 
responsibility for setting regulations but private-sector actors are given responsibility for setting 
criteria for and overseeing enforcement, as well as the responsibility for actually executing 
enforcement. The regulations are not actively enforced unless private-sector actors actually take 
responsibility for overseeing enforcement and execute enforcement. Private-sector actors may 
nevertheless see it as in their interests to enforce regulations for a variety of reasons: to reduce the 
risks associated with free-market trade; to distinguish themselves from other actors; because they 
expect a governmental enforcement framework to be put into action if they do not take action 
themselves; or because private-sector actors may take responsibility for enforcement as they feel the 
need for guaranteeing particular public rights (cf. Baldwin and Cave, 1999, chapter 10). If this is done, 
an enforcement relationship may exist between enforcer and regulatee and supervisory 
relationships, oversight, may exist between and within private-sector actors. The substitute co-
regulation regime is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Substitute co-regulation regime 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential outcomes of this regime-type are described in the regulatory literature as ‘going beyond 
compliance’ or ‘win-win situations’ (cf. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992, 98; Gunningham and Grabosky, 
1998, 413-422). 
 
This regime-type appears to be a popular structure for various kinds of private-sector related 
initiatives, such as assessment tools and certification programmes that aim ‘to reach beyond the 
mere requirements of building codes’ (Horvat and Fazio, 2005, 76). For example, the Building 
Research Establishment Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM), an environmental 
assessment method for buildings, developed in the UK in the 1990s. BREEAM is developed by the 
BRE (Building Research Establishment), a subsidiary company owned by a trust in which members 
represent specific sets of interests, such as built-environment professionals and contractors. BREEAM 
establishes benchmarks for environmental performance by rating buildings on a four-point scale. 
Assessments are carried out by independent assessor organisations, which are licensed and trained 
by BRE. Assessment criteria are based partly on the English and Welsh Building Regulations (BRE, 
2006). After assessment, a certificate stating the rating is issued. However, as the certificate has no 
legal status it can only be used for promotional purposes (Horvat & Fazio 2005). Versions of BREEAM 
and similar tools have been, or are being developed, in Hong Kong, Australia, Canada and the US (cf. 
Cole, 1998; Cole, 2000; Craweley and Aho, 1999). 
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The downside of this regime is that the government loses its grip on the actual impact which the 
regulations have. Outcomes cannot be managed by means of enforcement by governmental actors. 
Doyle (1997, 42) assumes that different forms of regulation and regulatory enforcement ‘work best 
when they co-exist; that is, two-tier regulation is more likely to be superior [to single-tier 
regulation]’. On the basis of these notions, it may be supposed that substitute co-regulation will work 
best when it is used to supplement one of the previously described regimes, either ‘pure’ or hybrid 
forms of governance. 
 
An example of such a two-tier regulatory regime can be found in the recently introduced ‘hidden 
defects insurance’ in the Netherlands. This covers costs resulting from hidden defects which originate 
from the original construction of the building, but which only reveal themselves after the building is 
occupied. Insuring these risks was impossible before the introduction of this type of insurance (Van 
den Berg and Overtoom, 2006). Before issuing a policy the insurer will require an independent 
private actor to check the work during design and construction as well as a document of approval 
once the building is finished. The grounds for these control tasks are Dutch building regulations as 
laid down by national government, the Building Decree, and where applicable, additional European 
norms. 
 
Private regime 
 
The final regime is characterised by the absence of any government involvement. It is left solely to 
private-sector actors to set and enforce building regulations, and if this is done, the regulations will 
not be statutory. Private-sector actors may find that it is in their interests to set up and enforce 
regulations, or take responsibility to guarantee certain public interests by setting and enforcing 
regulations. If this is done, there may be an enforcement relationship between the enforcer and 
regulatee and a supervisory relationship, oversight, between and within private-sector actors. The 
private regime is illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5 Private regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private regimes in a built environment context have been described by Bunz et al., 2006 and Cole, 
2000 and are often seen to display strong similarities with assessment tools and certification 
programmes introduced under the substitute co-regulation regime. The only respect in which they 
differ is that the initiatives do not refer to public building regulations. 
 
LEVEL 
REGULATION  
ENFORCEMENT CRITERIA AND OVERSIGHT  
EXECUTION OF ENFORCEMENT TASKS 
ACTORS 
PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
PRIVATE 
SECTOR 
 
PRIVATE REGIME 
- 
- 
- 
X 
X 
X 
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Other examples can be found in regulations drawn up by private-sector agencies to harmonise issues 
that have not been regulated through public legislation. In the Netherlands the national organisation 
for standardisation (NEN), a private-sector company, provides guidance when parties enter into an 
agreement on products, procedures or processes and publishes these agreements (NEN, 2006). Once 
the agreement is set, it is known as a standard, and these standards can be considered as private-
sector regulations. NEN has been so successful in developing standards that many Dutch public 
building regulations refer to NEN standards as the minimum technical requirements that must be 
met. 
 
Note that this type of private-sector regulation through the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO) does have a considerable impact on the building industry worldwide. The well-
known ISO 9001 and ISO 14000, both a generic set of requirements for implementing a management 
system, the former concerning quality, the latter concerning environmental issues, appear to have a 
particularly strong impact on the construction industry worldwide (Ball, 2002; Chini and Valdez, 
2003; Pheng and Wee, 2001; Walker, 2000). 
 
4 Conclusion and discussion 
 
This paper has drawn on the regulatory literature to build a general heuristic framework that can be 
applied in the comparative policy analysis of building regulatory regimes. This framework has been 
applied to draw up a typology of regulatory regimes. Based on illustrative examples and commentary 
within the literature, the potential impact of the regimes has been discussed. The framework and its 
related typology will ultimately be utilised by the author as part of an extended empirical 
investigation and the findings from that enquiry will be published at a later date. 
 
As the reader will have noticed, the regulatory regimes introduced are ideal type normative models. 
Real-life cases will prove more complex and difficult to categorise as the illustrative examples have 
shown. For example, in reality, a wide arrangement of actors can be involved in the regulatory 
regimes. These include trans-national governments, national, regional and local governments, 
industry players, insurance companies, certification and audit organisations, consumer interest 
groups and so on. Together, these actors make up the organisational field in which the regulatory 
regime functions (cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Due to the complexity of real-life cases, the 
specific actors involved cannot be set a priori but must be defined on the basis of empirical 
investigation (ibid, p. 148). When analysing more complex forms of governance, for example trans-
nationalisation, actors can be added to the schemes introduced by adding extra columns. It should 
also be noted that the normative types introduced are limited by their focus on regulatory regimes in 
developed countries. Their usefulness may be more limited for developing countries (cf. Haines, 
2003). It should also be noted that in reality, as the examples have shown, different regimes are 
often implemented side by side, which might result in different relationships between actors within 
these regimes. 
 
Nevertheless, precisely because of the complexity of reality, the framework and typology will provide 
an essential tool in the author’s proposed comparative analysis of regulatory governance within the 
built environment. Comparative analysis of different regimes is expected to identify causal 
relationships between regime-designs and regime-outcomes. The understanding thereby generated 
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will assist policy makers when faced with the difficult choice of implementing new regulatory tools or 
of overhauling an existing regulatory regime.  
 
However the extent to which cases are genuinely comparable presents a particular difficulty for 
research based on comparative analysis. For example, when seeking to analyse different certification 
initiatives, this particular label is soon discovered to have different meanings in different 
jurisdictions, as the as the illustrative examples in this paper have shown. Comparing regimes 
because they are similarly labelled may in fact be like comparing apples and oranges simply because 
they are both labelled ‘fruit’. Comparing different varieties of apples, however, may provide an 
understanding of which tastes best, or is the most resistant to parasites and why. 
 
This paper has argued that the same principle applies to regulatory regimes. It has briefly discussed 
the possible regime-outcomes of some of the examples used to illustrate the typology. These 
discussions suggest that both advantages and disadvantages are associated with certain regime 
types. The author’s empirical research will establish the value of this initial exercise. The challenge 
for governments when choosing to implement a certain regime therefore appears to involve striking 
a balance between these advantages and disadvantages. The empirical research aims to identify the 
actual advantages and disadvantages associated with particular organisational structures of 
regulation and enforcement and to add to our general understanding of the effects of introducing 
public and private-sector actors in regulatory governance within the built environment.  
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